In the rest of the world, oil heightens the danger of both “governmental” conflicts (over control of the central government) and secessionist conflicts; but in Latin America, oil is only linked to governmental conflicts. This is not because Latin American petroleum has unusual properties, but because the region is “secession-proof”: there have been no separatist conflicts in Latin America for over a century. Latin America’s great anomaly is not the absence of oil-based secessionist conflicts, but the absence of all secessionist conflicts.
That is Michael Ross writing on Latin America’s missing oil wars. They will not be missed.
6 Responses
I have not read all that much on Latin American politics, but my sense is that Latin America doesn’t have more secessionist movements because all of whom want power have access to it. Developing countries with huge wealth disparities and resource wealth, it seems to me, are likely gain political stability when all possible stakeholders are appeased with access to wealth and power. I think you’re more likely to have conflict when someone with power is locked out. This is why I think that secessionist tensions mean nothing. If someone with wealth and influence is disgruntled, then you’re more likely to see some trouble.
I really think that ‘TE’ and ‘dan k’ are overestimating the importance of secessionist tensions in Venezuela and Bolivia. AFAIK these tensions can be wholly explained by internal political conflicts and the secessionism serves only to mobilize voters against the incumbent government and for more local control over tax revenues.
No one in these movements really believes that it is possible to create a new country nor they consider the possibility of engaging in an armed conflict to achieve their political aims. In this sense these movements end up being similar to secessionist movements that exist in Europe and Canada (Belgium, Scotland, Quebec, etc) because they can create some ‘noise’ but will probably not lead to actual secession and almost surely will not lead to an armed conflict.
The argument above does not imply that LA is as stable as Europe or that no armed conflicts, coups or variations will occur in this region. They can. But if they happen they will probably not have a secessionist flavor. Somehow I believe that this is in line with Michael Ross’ claims.
Hmmmm… Bolivia (and specifically the three states that form the “media luna” crescent in the East) has had serious secessionist tensions directly related to gas deposits off and on for the last 10-15 years.
There (contra Michael Ross above) it is the elite and Caucasian minority that is agitating to separate itself from Evo and the indigenous majority in the highlands.
Benjamin – I suspect the US government wants to make friends with incumbents in oil-rich states, be they dictators or democrats. And for all of Chavez’s rhetoric, he is still happy to sell us as much oil as he can.
TE – this is indeed true. But it seems to me significant that this has never led to outright violence – while violence of many others types is ubiquitous. It’s especially interesting to me that there is no ethnically-based separatist violence, even in poor indigenous communities with lots of petroleum wealth – in Mexico, for example, or Ecuador
The fact that there hasn’t been secessionist conflicts in a long time in Latin America doesn’t mean that there are not secessionist tensions in the region related to oil.
In Venezuela, the most important oil exporter of the region, the secessionist tensions in the Zulia state, where most of the oil is drilled, is a very well known fact.
Another question: Why does the US continue to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (e.g. Egypt), another oil-rich region, while it has mostly stopped doing so in Latin America? Why no CIA-backed coup in Venezuela like the ones that overthrew Salvador Allende in Chile and Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran?